Case Studies

Ultimately, experience is the best teacher. The AMC Research Collaboration has applied its value creation model to 43 different advanced materials ventures (and counting).

To date, five of these companies have been profiled as case studies. We encourage you to learn more by downloading their associated publications.

  

In 1992, Hyperion Catalyst brought the first commercially viable multiwalled (MW) carbon nanotube technology to market. Fibril, as the product was named, had been in development for nearly a decade.

During the R&D phase, the company struggled to choose between the many potential uses for their advanced materials product and process inventions. Promise lay in areas as diverse as the automotive, aerospace, and power generation industries. But what turned promise to reality was a turning point — a partnership with another company able to deliver a key component to the technology’s success. 

Starting on page 19 of our publication, "Commercializing Generic Technology: The Case of Advanced Materials Ventures" [Maine & Garnsey, Research Policy, 2006], we examine the issues that Hyperion Catalyst faced as it considered how best to commercialize its pioneering product.
Download the paper.

 

Hyperion Catalyst’s path to value creation from an advanced material was hardly without challenge, but compared to Cambridge Display Technology’s path, it was a walk in the park. Beginning in 1992, CDT sought to commercialize organic light emitting diode technology (O-LED), most commonly known now as a polymer LED (PLED). PLED displays do not require backlights, are highly energy efficient, and, in theory, can be mass-produced using modified ink jet printers — almost as if one were printing a photograph.

But, as CDT and its investors learned, what might have sounded like a winning technology proved difficult to bring to commercial reality, for a myriad of technical-, market-, finance-, and business-related issues. Learn more about CDT ’s challenges by turning to page 23 of "Commercializing Generic Technology: The Case of Advanced Materials Ventures" [Maine & Garnsey, Research Policy, 2006]. Download the paper.


Renamed Evonik after its 2007 acquisition, Degussa AG is one of the world’s oldest chemicals companies. The company had long developed and produced nanoparticles such as catalysts, pigments, and fumed oxides. But its business structure discouraged R&D of high-risk, high-reward innovations — and consequently, Degussa was functionally unable to develop, let alone commercialize, new nanomaterials.

The company recognized how this could, one day, jeopardize its success, and chose to make two bold steps: the launch of a "politically protected" internal nanomaterials R&D venture, and the acquisition of relevant third-party developments through its Business Ventures group.

Were these steps enough to let Degussa become a leader in nanomaterials? What unanticipated challenges did the company face as it tried to commercialize its developments? Read for yourself, starting on page 7 of "Radical Innovation through Internal Corporate Venturing: Degussa’s Commercialization of Nanomaterials" [Maine, R&D Management, 2008]. Download the paper.

  

NanoGram Corporation, founded in 1996, looked set for success by the late-’90s. It had financing, innovative IP, a dynamic CEO — and the goal of developing and manufacturing nanostructured materials for a broad range of markets, including medical devices, planar optical devices, fuel cells, solid state lighting, information displays, high resolution imaging and solar cells.

When these plans collided with a perfect storm — the tech sector decline, Sept. 11th, 2001, and the flight of investment capital — NanoGram was left with a multitude of IP and potential markets, and no one willing to fund its broad mission.

NanoGram’s survival strategy was creative and innovative. An initial restructure into two separate, vertically focused companies proved attractive to investors. This, in turn, led to the creation of a new platform corporation focused on nanomaterials R&D and IP licensing, and an enthusiastic reception from many quarters.

This compelling story is being profiled in a forthcoming AMC Research Collaboration publication; meanwhile, we invite you to download an excerpt. 

An Anonymous Carbon
Nanomaterials Start-up (CNS)

Ambition can be a powerful virtue for any venture. But when a company attempts to capture all of the value its technology can create, it can end up with none.

Consider a "Carbon Nanomaterials Startup," spun out from a prestigious American university in 2001. The founder, a professor, pioneered a cost-effective way to produce fullerenes — hollow, carbon molecules such as “buckeyballs” and carbon nanotubes. With angel financing, eager students to tap for staffing, and a top university’s assistance, the venture's pedigree and prospects were impressive.

But sometimes ambitious academics don’t see the business realities of the commercialization process. In this case, the company's attempts to exploit the full potential breadth of its powerful technology, rather than focus initially on a few near-term markets with key alliance partners, nearly proved fatal. This instructive story starts on page 22 of "The Commercialisation Environment of Advanced Materials Ventures" [Maine & Garnsey, Technology Management, 2007]. Download the paper.